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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines a framework adopted by the government of Indonesia for identifying
criteria for choosing among various institutional arrangements for the development of the
Jabotabek Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) project. The framework is based on the assumption
that the size and complexity of the MRT project preclude effective management and control
by a single government entity. This leads to the need for establishing a specialized project
company consisting of several public and private companies with different financial strengths
and technical expertise. At the same time, this unbundling also allows potential private
investors to enter parts of the project with reasonable profit, while some (politically) strategic
parts of the project assets remain under government ownership.
The financing arrangements, including a share of equity and an adoption of a project finance
scheme, become important issues as they determine both the ownership structure of the
project and the responsibility for operating and managing the project assets. The intention
here is to make the rationale for choice of a project structure as transparent as possible. Four
base options for the project structure which involve different degrees of involvement by the
government and private sectors are discussed. It turns out that the choice is problematic as
the option which provides more management control over the assets and more non-recourse
financing is the one that requires construction risks to be borne by the government. Even
though this analysis does not clearly identify one unique optimal solution, it does provides
strategic and basic frameworks from which many plausible variations can be derived and
highlights the tradeoffs involved in structuring a private partnership agreement.
The thesis concludes by summarizing key policy issues that affect the actual choice and
performance of the two preferred options (concession and leasing). These include improving
administrative effectiveness to ensure the accountability of the project company, broadening
financial sources in order to free the government of the need to provide substantial subsidies
and guarantees, and designing effective regulation to hold private sector partners to the terms
of their contract.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
The primary purpose of privatization in Indonesia is to increase funding for
infrastructure development from the private (mostly foreign) capital market, so that a limited
government budget can be diverted to other productive sectors in which private investors may
not be interested. Privatization in transport infrastructure in Indonesia has been promoted
since the 1980s when the country suffered economically from the fall in real oil prices. As
the tax revenue from oil contributed a considerable share of the total government earning, the
fall in oil prices inevitably made the government budget shrink.
At the same time, the need for infrastructure expansions of all types is increasingly
apparent. Most urban areas, including the capital city of Jakarta, encounter severe road
congestion, while rural areas suffer from deteriorating access. To fulfill future demand, the
government of Indonesia realizes that relying solely on the traditional government-grant
approach cannot guarantee the provision of required infrastructures. The fiscal constraints on
the government have led to an increasing expectation that private finance is necessary to
address the capacity shortage.
The intention of using the private sector to tap capital for the provision of urban
transport infrastructure is legitimate. Other considerations in shifting towards greater private
involvement are also worth mentioning. These are the perceived expectation that the private
sectors can deliver infrastructure services with a greater efficiency, and have a better access
to technology and management. Although, some private investors perform below
expectation, the performance of private sector is generally better in terms of construction and
operation costs and the ability to furnish services that are more consumer oriented (Bond and
Carter, 1994; Smith and Walker, 1995). Technological development also contributes to the
argument for private involvement because it can diminish natural monopoly characteristics
and consent to unbundling, private entry and competition into many infrastructure services.
However, some shortcomings in promoting transport privatization in Indonesia have
inevitably occurred. The most noticeable problem is the lack of developed and
understandable regulations. The regulatory framework is generally inadequate and
ambiguous. Toll road law, for example, specifies that all toll increases are at the discretion of
the President rather than calculated on the basis of traffic demand, a situation which may
discourage a potential foreign private investor from participating. However, the intention of
tapping private capital for the transport infrastructure industry is far from realized. Ibanez
and Meyer emphasize the need for a regulatory scheme on transport privatization to secure a
balance between investor and user concerns (Ibanez and Meyer, 1993). Investors need
assurances with regard to key issues such as profitability and terms of concession, while users
insist on affordable transport services.
In addition, the efficiency argument for private active participation is in fact still
debatable. Some government officials often argue that efficiency gain is very difficult to
achieve, and cannot be attained unless the government firmly creates and continuously
maintains competitiveness in the market of infrastructure provision. There are still quite few
examples of private investors delivering public services in the country, and most of them are
relying on their political connection with a high-ranking government official. The example
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of a toll road privatization in Jakarta, the capital city, is a case in a point. The government
eventually had to provide substantial subsidies beyond payment for right-of-way, through
government-controlled domestic sources of capital (government-owned bank), thus replacing
other forms of domestic public and private spending.
Evidence shows that urban rail transit can hardly be run profitably regardless of its
ownership (public or private). This is due partly to a substantial required initial investment in
fixed guide-way alignment and higher operation and maintenance costs, and partly to an
increasing competitive pressure from other attractive modes, such as the automobile. The
price elasticity of ridership is generally high, so if one charged cost-recovering prices people
would tend not to use it, and one wants people to use it to reduce external costs, e.g.
congestion and pollution. As a consequence, fare box revenues are often inadequate to cover
capital and all operating costs. To cover costs, the transit operator is necessary to seek out
other sources of revenue, typically from land development, to subsidize the rail services,
which typically requires some degree of indirect or direct government subsidy. It is also
possible to incorporate additional project participants, which inevitably leads to greater
entanglement in forming and sustaining coalitions and partnerships. In short, privatization of
rail transit is inherently difficult to implement.
In order to implement a privatized transport project successfully, the government has
to be aware of the potential difficulties, particularly given the fact that rail transit systems
have historically been unprofitable. The attributes of the project structure, ownership of the
project, and the framework of project concession between government and investor indeed
play a key role in determining whether it is possible to achieve the objectives of privatization.
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The objectives of this thesis are: a) to examine the existing policies and challenges of
a proposed urban transit system to be implemented in the DKI Jakarta; b) to outline strategic
institutional planning, including regulation and financing structure, that is most appropriate to
ensure sustainability of such urban transport provision; and c) to provide a preliminary
model or approach for designing a similar transport project in other specific urban areas. 1
For this study, I draw on the case of the Jabotabek Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) Project
which is currently at the stage of project development. 2 This project commenced in the
1980s and is designed to be a rail based transit system to be completed in 2015. The
Jabotabek MRT project may be thought of as a good example of an urban area facing a high
growth of commuter trips and experimenting with a staged transport development model
consistent with its long-term development. The project area, which includes the special
capital district of Jakarta, requires a good transport system. The district is not only of
international importance because of its economy, its size and its status as the national capital,
but also because it is efficient, socially advanced, and rich culturally. The elimination of
bottlenecks which presently have been reducing the potential contribution of the region to
economic growth will encourage efficient resource use and ensure that the services system
furnished by the region is financially viable.
The Jabotabek urban transport development will eventually be based on a rail transit
system. Several studies which have been conducted by different government agencies
1 DKI of Jakarta refers to the Jakarta capital metropolitan area (DKI is the Indonesian
abbreviation of Daerah Khusus Ibu kota).
2 Jabotabek is an acronym for the Jakarta metropolitan region comprising the special district of
Jakarta, and its vicinity municipalities of Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi.
11
recommended the implementation of a mass rapid transit system, based on the use of a
combination of Light Rail Transit (LRT), and conventional heavy rail service. 3 One of the
main issues is ridership in relation to the transit fare and how to finance the project, since the
construction and maintenance costs are high. In order to get sufficient revenue, the fare
might be set at Rp 3,000 (approximately $ 1.5) or more.4 If the fare were set at a such a high
level, the issue of affordability and level of use given demand elasticity remain.
1.2 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 provides a brief literature review of the rationale behind private financing,
including the benefits and financing pattern of privatization. This chapter discusses a
concession scheme as a solution to the problem of natural monopoly, risk assessment and
allocation at each stage of development of the Jabotabek transit project. Finally, the issue of
pricing and subsidy is addressed as a means of government support for the private financing.
Chapter 3 discusses briefly the challenges and existing policy of Jabotabek transport
development. This chapter contains general major decisions that the government has
initiated, starting from a decision about the need for mass rapid transit and the intention to
use private financing. The basic design process of the transit project is also discussed.
Chapter 4 evaluates the possible project structure and financing of the Jabotabek
MRT project. This chapter also discusses the associated perceived risks faced by all parties
3 Jabotabek Urban Mass Transit Preparation Program, Consolidated Network Proposal, Inter-
Departmental Working Group, Ministry of Communication, Government of Indonesia,
February 1993.
4 This figure is based on information from Tomokazu Wachi (the Pacific Consultants
International) who has been working for the Jakarta Mass Rapid Transit Project from the
middle of September 1995.
in the transit project, including the mitigation of such risks among the parties, through
various contractual arrangements.
Chapter 5, the final chapter, draws some conclusion from the Jabotabek approach. I
conclude this chapter by outlining some unsettled issues of the MRT project that need to
study further and by recommending strategies for the government to use in reshaping the
management decision-making process for the development of urban transport infrastructure
in the future.
2. PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCING OF INFRASTRUCTURE
This chapter addresses issues associated with private financing of transit railway
infrastructure. Four elements are discussed: solutions to natural monopoly, the structure of
project financing, risk assessment and allocation, and government incentives. Understanding
these interrelated elements will help us to understand the success of the private participation.
Natural monopoly is the initial issue that deserves careful attention, since it has been a
characteristic of mostly large infrastructure activities. Another common characteristic of a
large scale project is high up-front capital costs and long payback periods. Such
characteristics make the financing structure of the project critical to the success and timely
completion of the project. Assessment of project risks and their mitigation allow for an
appropriate interlocking contractual agreement between project parties, whereas the
government incentives will in turn make the project arrangement workable. The
interrelationship of all these factors will determine the financing pattern and structure of the
project that fit best the existing economic and political situation in a particular country.
2.1 Concession and Regulation
Natural monopoly generally leads to pricing problems since the monopolist may be
able to set prices in an industry well above the prices that would rule under competitive
market. Many argue that a concession scheme can be a solution to problems of natural
monopoly. Demsetz promotes an approach to the solution that distinguished between
"competition within the field" and "competition for the field" (Demsetz, 1968). The latter is
assumed to be an adequate substitute for the former where competition is not possible. The
essential idea of concession, which is also well known as franchise, is to allow one to
compete for the right to be the natural monopolist.
Concession avoids the problem of pricing by bringing about the threat of entry into
industry and gives rise to potential competition that can discourage the monopolist from
exercising his market power (Dnes, 1995). A concession scheme simply awards a right to the
best offering company for a given quality and quantity of product or service. This monopoly
franchise can be auctioned off to the bidder offering the most attractive terms, for example
lower price but best services, or lower required subsidy, etc. The auction may be sequentially
repeated to ensure product performance.
Another solution to natural monopoly leaves such industry in private hands but
regulates the behavior of the private firms to prevent them from exploiting their monopoly
positions (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Ibanez, 1995; Amstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994).
Two different type of regulations are often used: a rate of return (often used in the U.S.) and
caps on price (used in the U.K). In both cases, the government needs to establish
commissions to set pricing as a cap rate to allow balanced interests of both investors and
consumers.
Many argue that the objectives of both forms of regulations are difficult to attain,
particularly if they are going to be applied in developing countries. Train and Liston
conclude that the approaches create difficulties in maintaining a competitive environment
(Train, 1991; Liston, 1993). Both require a high level of technical sophistication and the
analytical capacity of the commission and the regulated firms in regularly determining the
cap of pricing and rate of return. The commission is also generally vulnerable to being
politicized and uses its discretion to pursue other objectives.
The concession scheme offers a fundamentally different approach and may be best
seen as an alternative form of regulation for natural monopoly. Demsetz argues that the
concession approach avoids the need for complex regulatory proceedings and thus for
regulatory commissions. This is probably the main reason why a concession scheme has
been a common practice in developing countries as they have less experience with regulatory
commissions (Ibanez, 1995). The advantage of the concession scheme over regulation is
further raised by Dnes, where an infrastructure activity is difficult to privatize outright, where
a limited privatization is allowable, or where a government wishes to avoid the costs of
regulation method. He adds, however, that the scheme still needs a careful work on the
design and administering of contracts, procurement methods, and monitoring agencies.
Concession contracts, therefore, have to be designed to be as flexible as possible, so
that there is a means for sharing the risks attached to changes in demand, or increase in the
costs of inputs. Contracts may also stipulate the terms under which assets must be transferred
to a successor company. This stipulation is generally required to ensure the continuing
interest of would be bidders and create a competitive bidding environment for the renewal of
the contract.
2.2 Benefits and Pattern of Private Financing
Development of infrastructure is now seen as an emerging market by the private
investors. Bond and Carter assume four reasons for such change (Bond and Carter, 1994).
First, public monopoly ownership and provision of infrastructure services have caused a
severe disenchantment due to poor performance. Second, fiscal constraints on governments
and external aid agencies have allowed for private financing on some important types of
economic infrastructure. Third, technological developments have reduced natural monopoly
characteristics and allowed unbundling, private entry and competition into many
infrastructure services. Fourth, innovative financing techniques and the globalization of
financial markets are offering more infrastructure financing options.
The emphasis is further given to the fact that private investors have better access to
managerial and technical expertise and capital, while at the same time they demand explicit
risk allocation and mitigation (Bond and Carter, 1994; Smith and Walker, 1995). They offer
professional and modem management including cost and operational efficiency to
infrastructure projects. During the operation of infrastructures, the private sponsor may
promote the transfer of technology and know-how through the project or government. They
can attract foreign capital (loan or equity) to a country and shift away the burden of capital
from the government. Since the capital is made without direct government guarantee, it does
not appear as a public debt, but allows immediate implementation of projects which might
not otherwise have been implemented due to national budgetary constraints. In general, the
private sectors can expedite infrastructure development in cases where absence or delay
would constrain a country's economic development. Their willingness to finance, build, and
operate the infrastructure project over a long period, can also be seen as an indication of
project viability.
This arrangement identifies various elements that private investors can offer to the
government, and the government will be expecting. One such element is performance. If the
private investors are able to improve performance because of the competitive pressures which
are brought to bear upon it, then obviously this improvement will be attractive to the
government. Moreover, burdens, including infrastructure expenditures that would otherwise
be carried by the government, can be shifted to the private investors. The extent and the
scope of the shift is really a matter of negotiation, but the private investors will undertake a
considerable amount of responsibility during construction and operation. The final element is
additionality in terms of both better access to non-guaranteed private finance and available
human resources.
Bond and Carter further mention that matching the risk-return requirements of
different sources of finance with the nature of infrastructure projects is the state-of-the-art of
private financing. Financing for infrastructure is mobilized from many sources, including
both private foreign and domestic lenders or investors, credits from suppliers, project-cash
generation, and some lending from multilateral banks. Equity, a basic financing instrument,
is long term capital provided in terms of shares that signify part ownership. Shareholders
will receive dividends or a capital gain or loss from their asset. They take risks of not
receiving dividends if the project makes losses, but share profits. Equity is generally drawn
from sponsors, private placements and public offering, as well as the project cash generation.
Debt is another basic instrument involving funds lent to a project company with the project's
underlying assets as a collateral. Lenders seek project cash flows that can finance debt
repayment with margin, and recourse to sponsors in the event of problems encountered by the
project.
The cash needed for an infrastructure project varies depending on the stage of project.
The stage of project development requires funds and does not generate any cash. Since at
this stage the project has very few tangible assets, financing is needed to be satisfied by
equity investment of the sponsors. At construction stage, fund requirements increase
considerably. As the project continues, the fund requirement accumulates and reaches its
peak at the end of the project. During this period, financing will come from various sources,
including the equity from sponsors and credit from suppliers. But the major part of financing
is generally from borrowing and debt. Senior debt constitutes a major part of private
financing in almost infrastructure projects and its average is normally about 60 percent (Bond
and Carter, 1994). Once the project is operational, it generates revenue which is used to pay
interest and principle of debt and eventually provide return on the investors' equity.
2.3 Risk Assessment and Allocation
Risk analysis is the central feature of private financing of infrastructure. Each party
involved faces risks. A key dimension of project financing, therefore, is the correct
identification of risks and allocation of them among various parties involved in the project
(Beidleman, Flecther, and Vesbosky, 1990). The main question of the analysis is simply who
is willing to bear what risks. Bond and Carter suggested three stages of risk analysis. First,
the severity of each risk needs to be assessed. Each party will question the likelihood of
failure of each phase of the project and ask himself whether or not it can seriously affect his
position. Second, the party that is in the best position to manage each risk is identified. For
example, the project sponsor is best able to manage commercial risks, whereas the
government has control over regulatory risks. Third, each risk is allocated, priced or
mitigated among the parties, via contractual agreements.
Each stage of project development has its own unique risk (Nevitt, 1989; Tiong,
1990). At the early stage, the development generally consists of conducting a feasibility
study, including the assessment of appropriate technology, and preparing a bid. Funding is
usually primarily venture capital provided mostly by the government and project sponsors.
The main risk at this stage is having a project proposal dropped by the government or the
financiers. Ambiguous concession proposals and arbitrary procedures can usually result in
potential sponsors either not bidding, investing less, or requiring a higher premium to
compensate likely delays. The government institutions lacking experience in such project
and the failure of contract-awarded sponsors to mobilize finance can also contribute to the
risk.
During the construction stage, accurate estimation of the completion time is critical.
This phase uses cash extensively without generating any revenue. Delay in completion can
become quite costly for the sponsors because funds are mostly tied up without any return.
The completion risk is sometimes also shared by the contractor, since they are normally asked
to provide a completion guarantee. Another major risk during construction that is shared by
both the sponsors and contractor is cost overrun, which is caused by a number of different
factors, such as inflation, increase in the input price, change in government regulation, etc.
One has also to consider risk associated with the sponsor's performance, that is, a failure of
the sponsor to provide specific goods and services on a timely basis for the contractor.
Risks associated with the operational phase of a project include off-take, operational
cost overrun, sponsor's performance, liability risks, and equity resale value. These risks
generally are related to overestimated revenue projection and high operational costs, and also
with failure to meet certain regulatory standards. Revenue projection, therefore, is critical as
it ascertains the viability and, particularly, the debt servicing ability of infrastructure projects.
For a railway transit, the relevant figure would be a fare box revenue. Accordingly, a
comprehensive and accurate travel demand forecasting is necessary with specific attention
being given to the effect of both competition from alternative routes or modes and the future
development of land use. Lenders may require annual updates of the transit ridership and
revenue projections to secure themselves from expensive and unintended foreclosure.
2.4 Government Incentives: Congestion Pricing and Subsidy
In general, a clear policy statement by the government on private financing will create
credibility for attracting foreign sponsors. This can be done through proper legislation that
provides a clear understanding of the legal requirements and regulatory measures for
implementing infrastructure projects, including standard provisions for agreement in regard
to the general concept of private financing. Some forms of government incentives may also
be required to reassure the investors, such as paying for all or part of the feasibility study,
paying for land, tax holidays and other fiscal concessions.
Some risks are assumed to be the government's responsibility. Risk sharing will vary
according to the country's credit standing, political stability, and economic position (Nevitt,
1989; Shapiro, 1992), but is likely to include safeguards against force majeure events,
exchange rate movements and currency convertibility, repatriation of earning, and restriction
on capital repatriation. Some forms of financial commitments are also necessary, such as
loans, passive investment with equity, subordinate loans to make up cash flow shortfalls, and
direct participation in project equity.
For a railway transit project, the market risk, that is uncertainty in the level of
ridership and therefore revenue potential, is a major concern. Several incentives may be
called for by the sponsors to improve transit ridership and, therefore, generate more revenues.
The most important are road congestion pricing, subsidy, land use control, and marketing
(Obeng, 1972). Peak-hour pricing of automobile trips and downtown parking overcharge
have also been suggested as a means of increasing transit ridership and reduce congestion on
street network (Sherman, 1972; Vickery, 1974). The government, therefore, can impose
either peak-hour pricing on private vehicles using city street network along the proposed
transit corridor or charging a higher parking rate at peak hour period in the city center. The
result would be fewer total trips by private vehicles in the network and an increase in transit
ridership. This improvement in ridership is necessary since rail transit under normal
(competitive) conditions is generally not viable in commercial terms.
Government subsidy is inevitably necessary in railway transit development (Obeng,
1972; Sherman, 1972; Khan, 1989). There are some rationales that the subsidy level for
transit projects has to be set, agreed upon and committed to for the life of the projects. The
government may generally be concerned with the objective of income distribution and,
thereby, request to improve transit access for special groups of people, such as low income,
senior citizen, handicapped, etc. If the transit project will be provided by the private sectors,
whose prime concern is making profit out of the project, the issue of the government subsidy
is critical. How much the government is willing to subsidize the privatized project at
economically feasible, given the fact that the private investors will enjoy such support?
In that situation, the rationale of subsidy for transit projects may not only relate to a
distribution of income, but also relate to the existence of direct and indirect impacts on the
quality of service of the urban area where the privatized project is located. For example, one
can allow the subsidy if there is a perceived positive impact on external prices outside the
domain of transport sector, energy conservation, relieving traffic congestion, improving urban
environment, etc. All of these rationales for subsidy needs to be agreed upon among all level
of decision makers, and among related agencies within the government before they are taken
into consideration into a process of designing the subsidy.
3. JABOTABEK MASS TRANSIT PLANNING
3.1 Challenges and the Existing Policy
The urban transport system in Jabotabek suffers from its physical deficiencies.
During the working week congestion occurs on many corridors almost at all hours. Traffic
snarls and costly delays occur almost everywhere, particularly near business centers and at
major artery interchanges. Within the city of Jakarta, too many cars compete for scarce road
space which may be increased only at a significant cost. The number of passengers cars has
been growing at approximately 9% per year. Figure 1 illustrates the hourly southbound
traffic flow on Jl. Sudirman, i.e., along the proposed MRT alignment from the Blok M - Kota
corridor, for three years (1985, 1990, and 1995). This is worsening congestion (Almec,
1996).
Efforts to increase the effective space often ends up with more traffic so that
congestion quickly closes in again to slow the pace. The most troublesome transportation
problem is meeting the peak demand of the journey-to-work. About 10 to 12.5% of all daily
travel by public and private transportation occurs in the peak hours (JMTSS, 1992). This
peak-hour demand requires of course a concentration of labor and equipment which are idle
during other hours.
Mass transit operations, mostly provided by a variety of different buses, furnish an
uncomfortable and inconvenient service with low average speed. The most serious cause of
discomfort is overcrowding on buses. Loads carried by many buses operating on main
corridors in rush hours exceed seating capacity. The buses themselves exacerbate traffic
problems by their number. In the morning peak, almost 50% of bus routes by direction are
overloaded. Low average speed is a problem particularly within and near the central business
district. The average rate of speed for bus transit in rush-hour travel is significantly less than
that for private automobiles of about 15 to 20 km/hour (TNPR, 1992). Figures 2 and 3 show
the vehicle journey time for the entire Blok M - Kota corridor during the working days based
on the survey conducted in October 1995 (JMTSS, 1992).
In addition, noise, heat (Jakarta is one of the hottest cities in the country), unprotected
or unattractive way stations and terminals, together with long periods of standing and
unpredictable waiting times, are common disadvantages of transit travel. The transit industry
has scarcely recognized the technological progress that has been made in comfort standards.
A high proportion of obsolete and depreciated equipment is still in use as part of the mass
transit fleet. This inferior performance of bus public transport has diverted a number of
passengers from public transport to private vehicles. Results of the TNPR study have shown
that the use of public transport as a prime mode of travel has declined, and its share of trips
has fallen from about 54 % of the total trips in 1985 to almost 50 % in 1990.
Institutional deficiency is another problem in the Jabotabek transport system.
Responsibility for transportation in Jabotabek is divided among various functional units, and
it is fragmented into several overlapping tasks. Urban transport in Jabotabek is in the
administrative responsibility of several major authorities; these are at least four local
governments, including the provincial government of the DKI Jakarta, two central
government agencies (Directorate General for Highway/Bina Marga and Directorate General
for Land Transportation and Inland Waterways), commuter railroad (Perumka), toll highway
companies, and numerous private and municipal bus lines.
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Blok M - Kota Corridor). Source: Study on Transport Revenue Improvement
Program for Jakarta MRT, Technical Paper 4. 10 January 1996.
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Until recently there has been a minimum of communication, even among parties at
the local government level, and there is no apparent institutional channel for resolving
disputes on vital policy matters. Moreover, there is a severe shortage of skilled personnel at
each level of government in the numerous disciplines required for transportation planning
and policy-making. Jabotabek transit services suffer from a lack of top-quality staff and
management personnel.
Because of the fragmentation of institutions engaged in the operation of Jabotabek
transportation and its development of policy, the functioning of the urban-transportation
system is inadequately understood and no effort has been made to consider alternatives for
urban transport development. This leads to a problem of conceptual deficiency which renders
a set of unsettled issues, such as the defining of comparative roles of various modes of urban
transport, the optimum means of financing urban transport infrastructure, and the overall
objectives of transportation planning of the city. For example, analysts question whether a
huge highway investment in the city of Jakarta would alleviate the severe traffic congestion
in the city, ration the increasing growth of private vehicles, or just provide another incentive
for private car travelers at the cost of scarce expensive land.
3.2 Modeling in Urban Transport and Policy Planning
For many years, the government has been busy with an analytical structure for
Jabotabek transportation planning, which is based on travel demand projection models and on
balancing trip assignments to link capacities. This merely technical approach has resulted in
a weak commitment to an appropriate mass transit system, partly because all transport models
were run along the lines of a past trend and partly because the models are insensitive to policy
directions. For example, the models fail to recognize the importance of clean air, energy
conservation, etc. As a result, Jabotabek has called for huge urban highway investments and
relatively insufficient mass transit improvement.
The initiative for mass transit development in Jabotabek came from outside the
regular transport planning institution, which is determined on the policy level rather than on
the technical planning level. This policy planning is initially administered by the joint
committee for mass transit development between the central and the DKI Jakarta government
which provides the direction of the entire effort, including the essential inputs for all
subsequent steps. 1 This provides the link between the transport engineer/planner and the
political leadership in the city/country, and is a tool through which mass transit planning is
associated with several urban objectives, such as a desirable land use plan, distribution of
mobility to several groups of the urban population, and energy conservation objectives.
The joint committee has initiated some policy decisions concerning the mass transit
system in Jabotabek, but not until 1994 has it made a comprehensive effort to develop the
system. What is interesting about this current stage of Jabotabek mass transit planning is the
process of decision making, i.e. the fundamental resolution of whether or not the city should
undertake a mass transit system is merely a major policy decision not technical statement.
This happened evidently with the help of a currently very strong leader in the country, the
Minister of Research and Technology, who considers the need for a proper mass transit in the
city of Jakarta and its surrounding areas urgent. Under his supervision, some major decisions
regarding the basic concept of Jabotabek transit development have been made, or are
currently under discussion. Such decisions are made on some conceptual and technical
aspects, such as the following: a) type of desirable transit modes; b) network layout and
design; c) required facilities and level of services; and d) financial and institutional
arrangement of the construction and operation of the transit system.
3.3 Major Decisions
The first decision to be made after concluding the need for a mass transit system is the
choice of transit modes. The selection of the mode that fits the Jabotabek situation best has
been made by using comprehensive analytical data that indicate a match among the
characteristics of each mode considered, the physical layout of Jabotabek, and the preferred
level of services. This has been reviewed with extensive reliance on examples taken from
other countries, for example the transit systems in Germany, England, Singapore, etc., with
generalized description of their mass transit systems.2 On the basis of three major transport
planning studies previously conducted within Jabotabek, the government decided to adopt the
existing suburban heavy rail services in combination with Light Rail Transit (LRT) as the
basis of the new mass transit system. The LRT system will have a capacity of 52,000
passengers per hour per direction with three cars in operation, thus fulfilling the demand up
to the year 2015.
The second decision is with regard to a design of a transit network. The objective of
Jabotabek network design is generally clear. The network layout is planned with the
1 Decree of the Minister of Communication No. KP.72/HK.601/Phb.92 of 1992 assigned the joint
committee responsibility for preparing development of Jabotabek mass rapid transit.
2 Three major urban transport studies on Jabotabek transport are the Integrated Transport
System Improvement by Railway and Feeder Services (ITSI, 1990), the Jakarta Mass Transit
System Study (JMTSS, 1992), and the Transport Network Planning and Regulation (TNPR,
1992).
intention to achieve equal transport services to all regions in the city, and to alleviate traffic
concentration in the city's central business district. This is a very important decision since
the network layout will determine the travel demand for transit, which affects not only the
absolute ridership, but also who would ride the system, and for what types of trips the
network will be usable.
The conceptual mass transit system of Jabotabek, as shown in Figure 4, consists of
new LRT alignments (80 km), an existing rail alignment converted to LRT (65 km), and
suburban and regional heavy rail systems (80 km). The network will provide a high level of
service for the existing developed areas and the new business areas of the city, such as the
Sudirman corridor, the Golden triangle of Kuningan, the Kemayoran areas, etc., as well as the
developing areas in the east wing (Bekasi) and the west wing (Tangerang) of the city. In
addition, a new link of LRT will connect the city to the international Soekarno Hatta airport.
This proposed network of 225 km is to be completed by 2015 in four phases.
The first phase involves the construction of two lines along the very dense corridors
in the city. These two lines are intended to relieve the excessive movement of people in the
north/south direction (Kota to Blok M), while at the same time encouraging east/west
development (part of Tangerang-Bekasi line). The remaining phases consist of an extension
of this north-south section to the district south of the city (Bogor), an extension of the east-
west section connecting two districts in the east and west wings of the city (Tangerang and
Bekasi), as well as a completion of the city loop line.
The next critical steps that the government should take is the selection of the
appropriate facilities, furniture of the transit system, and the desirable level of operation.
Although there has not been a deep study on this matter nor a clear decision, there is a strong
tendency to apply modem technology rather than a least cost mass transit system. This seems
to be reasonable since the system would serve relatively higher income people in the country
and competition from other modes of travel transport is also severe. An attractive transit
system must be designed to influence its potential users.
However, the government also has to take into account the fact that the city has
neither enough experience in running and utilizing mass transit with modem technology nor
the managerial skill to operate such a system. The basic task is to form a suitable
combination of facilities and system furniture that will maximize the benefits to the system
while holding the cost outlays (operation and maintenance) within acceptable limits. This, of
course, require a careful selection of appropriate equipment for the system taking into
account the latest technology innovation and the capacity of technological absorption of the
entity who will operate the system.
A desirable level of transit service may be expressed in a number of forms. For
example, it can be measured in the form of variable frequency of service during peak hours, a
ratio between seating and standing passengers, hours of operation, average operating speed,
etc. The government has to accept specific assumptions in advance that clearly define the
level of service variations for the planned system, the required management capability, etc.
By adding to these the carrying capacity and flexibility of the system, as future needs will
require, the government can carry out a stage development plan for a modem transit system.
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A major decision that has not been taken yet is the financial analysis of the plan and
the formulation of specific courses of action in dealing with the financial impacts. There is
concern about costs imposed on the city by the proposed plan, as well as the means and
capabilities of financing these costs. In other words, the best method of financing the huge
construction costs of the transit plan and the substantial operating costs/deficits that the
operation and maintenance of the system may later impose on the city must be defined.
This financial analysis definitely affects the priorities of all elements of the proposed
system, including a schedule of construction and a method of project procurement. The
analysis comes to the planning process in terms of unit costs, the ability of the system to
produce revenues, the appropriate technology, and the political willingness to subsidize the
installation and operation of the transit system. There will be two major outcomes from this
analysis: to what extent the transit system can generate revenues; and what tolerable subsidies
are allowed from the government.
Private involvement in the proposed rail mass transit is the final aspect that the
government has to deal with. As privatization is another policy decision, it has its own
impact on the institutional setting. Moreover, the success of privatizing a transit system
extent not only depends on the institutional setting to some extent, but also on the inherent
profitability of the system. In other words, a privatized transit project is demand-driven in
nature. If there is a low demand for a transit facility, government cannot force it upon the
private sectors. On the contrary, the private sectors are often proactive in making
privatization proposals to the government if there are possible high returns to a particular
infrastructure project.
Although the basic premise of private involvement in the Jabotabek mass transit is
that transport service can be best delivered in the environment of a competitive market,
which is efficient and can be held accountable, there is no formal statement from the
government with regard to the objectives of private involvement, nor the strategy to be used
to attract potential private investors. The only legitimate reason why that government is
considering private participation is the need for tapping additional funding necessary to meet
the huge initial investment. Relief from the financial and administrative burden in
undertaking and maintaining the much needed infrastructure in the capital city seems to be
the main perceived objective of the government.
3.4 Process of the Basic Design
There are three major conceptual solutions to the Jabotabek transportation problem
(JETS, 1994). The first is to develop progressively a rail mass transit system in its own right
of way, segregated from other traffic. The second is to impose a scheme of congestion
pricing and other restrictions on the use of private vehicles, and the third, is to apply efficient
and comfortable bus systems integrated with the rail mass transit. It has been decided
(Consolidated Network Proposal, 1993) that the initial step will be to build a 14 km modern
electric passenger railway from just north of Blok-M to a northern terminal near the existing
Kota railway station, as shown in Figure 5. The route will include 15 stations constructed
either underground or elevated with the total cost estimated to be US $ 2.3 billion. The
government initiated the basic design for the project in late 1995. This basic design provides
a detailed engineering design, estimated costs, financing plans including the government
subsidy, a structure of the project, and a formulation of concession schemes between the
government and the private investors. 3
In August 1995, an agreement was reached between the government, represented by
the Governor of DKI Jakarta, and the consortium of private investors, the Indonesian-
Japanese-European Group (IJEG), to establish cooperation in carrying out the basic design as
well as in developing and implementing the transit railway project4 . There are two basic
aspects to cooperation according to this agreement. First, the Government appoints IJEG as
the investment partner on an exclusive basis, as a single body to cooperate with the
government to plan, develop, and implement the project, and later jointly establish a company
to replace IJEG. Second, the government will cooperate with IJEG to undertake the basic
design, with the objective of defining the project, planning the institutional arrangements, and
maximizing the feasibility and viability of the project for prompt implementation. The cost
for carrying out the basic design is approximately US$ 8 million most of which is provided
by IJEG (US$ 7.5 million), while the government contributes the balance. After reviewing
the completed basic design, IJEG may agree to proceed with the project further and the
contribution will be part of its equity investment in the project.
According to the agreement, the eventual form of the government-IJEG cooperation
will be the Jakarta Metro Corporation (JMC) as an umbrella company. Under JMC there will
3 The Guidance of the State Minister of Research and Technology/Head of the Agency for the
Assessment and Application of Technology/Chairman of BPIS as the Head of Steering
Committee of the Jakarta Mass Transit System, 30 June 1995.
4Memorandum of Understanding between the (City) Government and the IJEG on Mass Transit
Project Blok M - Kota, Jakarta, in the Republic of Indonesia, August 1995. The IJEG is a
single body comprised of two major groups: a consortium of Indonesian companies coordinated
by PT Citra Lamtoro Gung and PT Bakri Investindo, and a consortium of Japanese group lead
by ITOCHU and European group lead by the Ferrostaal AG.
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be three separate companies, each of which will own different assets of JMC. Company A
will own the tunnel and civil facilities of the transit railway; Company B will own and
operate the electro-mechanical system; and Company C will engage in the property business
of the transit system. The overall operation of JMC will be supervised of the Ministry of
Communication (MoC) through direct management and through licensing. MoC will
establish and enforce safety regulations for management and operations and control fare
levels and plans for future extensions. Moreover, DKI will be responsible for the
management and operation of the railway system as a public service obligation and, as a
shareholder, will be a core member of the board of management of JMC.
The Development of the First Priority MRT Lines Blok M - Kota and Dur - Kemayoran
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Figure 5 The First Section of the Jabotabek Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) Network
from Blok M to Kota. Source: Progress Report on The Jabotabek MRT Project to
the Governor of DKI Jakarta, 1996
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4. PROJECT STRUCTURE AND RISK MANAGEMENT
As noted in the previous chapter, the government promotes the privatization of the
MRT by issuing broad guidelines for framing the structure of the new project company, the
Jakarta Metro Corporation (JMC), that will be established for the purpose of developing the
Jabotabek mass transit project. The government will award a concession to JMC to develop
and operate the MRT project.' According to the guidelines, there will be three companies
under JMC, namely A, B, and a group of Company C, each of which will deal with different
specific tasks. This unbundling allows the potential private investors to enter parts of the
MRT project with reasonable profit, while some (politically) strategic parts of the project
assets remain under the government ownership. Company A, will be responsible for the civil
works, including excavation and underground construction of the transit system, and will
eventually own the transit facility. It will consist of a group of construction companies
sharing the company's assets, namely the state-owned companies, and domestic and foreign
private companies. The split of Company A ownership between domestic and foreign
companies will be fifty-fifty.
Company B will deal with electrical and mechanical works, vehicle provision, and the
operation of the system, and will be comprised of both domestic and foreign private
companies already operating in the transport service business. A higher proportion of foreign
companies relative to domestic companies in the ownership of Company B will be
1 This concession scheme allows the government to transfer responsibility for the design,
construction, financing, operation and maintenance of the MRT facility to the JMC. During the
concession period, the JMC seeks to repay all project debt and to achieve target equity return.
At the end of concession period, ownership is either transferred to the government (BOT) or
kept within the private sector (BOO).
encouraged by the government because the company will undertake part of the project that
requires much of imported equipment and technology. Company C is an entirely different
business, for it will be a property or real estate developer whose activity is not directly related
to transit services. This group will enter the project as a joint venture with DKI to carry out
development above the depot/terminal at certain locations along the transit track. Company
C exists to increase the potential income stream to the project company and thereby the
profitability of the transit project as a whole.
4.1 Project Structure
The project structure outlines the relationships between the four corporate entities,
i.e., JMC, Companies A, B and C. A feasible structure that can be adopted to a transit project
with the combined ownership of the public and the private sectors is difficult to set up. This
is because the entities involved in the project have different interests but share similar project
risks. The project structure clarifies contractual and commercial arrangements among the
entities, and its impact on financial arrangements is also substantial. For this reason, the
structure has to be as simple and reliable as possible because a complex structure creates
inherent uncertainties that would make it difficult for the potential private sectors to assess
the financial justification for their investments. The private sectors will seek the structure
that gives them tax and commercial efficiencies, so they can earn an adequate return from the
investment.
Four possible structures framing the relationship among the corporate entities are
shown in Table 1.2 There are two basic distinctions between the four options: whether or not
Company A and JMC are separated (see column 3), and whether or not Company B owns the
electrical and mechanical assets (E+M) of the project (see column 4). All options offer that
property development will be implemented by Company C.
Table 1 Alternatives for the MRT Project Structure
Option DKI contribution3  Corporate Ownership Obligation/ Right
# Entities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 equity JMC - Concession
on-lent debt, all equity A Civil assets Construction
on-lent debt, equity *) B E+M assets O & M
equity C Property Property development
2 on-lent debt, all equity JMC+A Civil assets Construction
on-lent debt, equity *) B E+M assets O & M
equity C Property Property development
3 on-lent debt, all equity JMC+A All assets Construction
equity *) B - Leasing, O&M
equity C Property Property development
4 on-lent debt, all equity JMC+A+B All assets Construction, 0 & M
equity C Property Property development
*) DKI may take equity in Company B if the private equity investors in Company B are
willing to accept that; however DKI cannot hold a controlling interest in the company.
Option 1 (see also Figure 6) requires that the four entities stand separately and are
bounded by contractual arrangements. JMC acts as a conduit between the grantor of the
2 The discussion on the evaluation of project structure is basically taken from the (draft) report of
the MRT Project Management Unit to be submitted to the Government of Indonesia, i.e., "Blok-
M Kota MRT Project, Ownership Structure Alternatives Report", March 1996.
3 DKI involvement in Company C can take many forms depending on the type of joint venture.
According to the Government guideline for this MRT project, it is likely that DKI will provide
land rights in exchange for a combination of up-front cash payment, carried equity interest,
and profit participation. The private investors provide financing for construction and
marketing expertise.
concession (and the land rights) and Companies A and B, and thus it will not earn revenues
from the project. The ownership of JMC will be shared jointly by Companies A and B and,
therefore, will be dictated by the contractual and commercial interests of both companies.
Company A, which will be owned entirely by DKI, will finance the civil assets of the MRT.
Its only source of cash flow is debt service support from DKI via the Jakarta Metro Fund
(JMF), a special account created solely for the MRT project managed by DKI. The company
in turn will enter the operation and maintenance agreement with Company B, a fully
privatized entity owning the E+M assets and operating on a commercial basis, whereby
Company B will have the right to utilize the civil asset. IJEG, as the project sponsor, and
other international investors, contribute to Company B's equity. Company B collects and
retains the fare box to be used for operating expenses, debt service, tax, and dividend
payment.
Option 2 is based on structure of the first option but proposes that JMC, for the sake
of simplification, combine with Company A (see Figure 7). The reason for this modification
is that the functions served by JMC in option 1 can also be carried out by Company A. The
distinction between option 1 and 2 is merely contractual and have no impact on financing
arrangement. Next, Option 3 proposes that the joint company (JMC and Company A) owns
all the assets of the MRT, including the electrical and mechanical assets (see Figure 8). This
joint company then enters into a leasing agreement with Company B which remains as the
operator of the MRT. For this right, Company B has the obligation to pay to Company A,
during the construction period, amounts equal to the equity of Company B and pay leasing
rental during the operation stage. These changes made in option 2 simplify the construction
contract arrangements by having only one employer, i.e., the joint company. Moreover,
option 3 provides maximum utilization of financing of E+M components available from
sovereign lenders and hence reduces the amount of financing required from other sources that
are more difficult to access.
Finally, option 4 basically is a variation of option 3 with the key distinction being the
merging of the asset owning company with the operating company (see Figure 9). This
change seems to simplify the contractual and commercial arrangements to the maximum
extent possible, on the premise that a simpler structure will be easier to explain/sell and
ultimately implement.
Option 1 conforms with the initial government proposal. This option, however, does
not appear to have substantial advantages over the other three options where Company A and
the JMC are merged. The role of JMC, as a conduit for contractual arrangements between
the government and the Companies A and B to construct and operate the MRT, can be
effectively carried out by Company A alone. In other words, JMC does not serve any useful
purpose. The project structure will be simpler if Company A and JMC are combined, so as to
eliminate additional contractual arrangements that would otherwise be needed.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, option 4 oversimplifies contractual and
commercial arrangements and creates unnecessary conflict within the single company
(JMC+A+B) that owns and operates the MRT. Conflict arises as a result of combining the
4This is particularly true if a turnkey construction contract for the total project is to be used. If
such a contract were made between JMC/Company A and the construction company, Company
B as the operator and party responsible for maintaining the MRT system may want to be
involved in the management of the contract to insure that its interests are protected.
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Figure 6 Option 1: the Structure of Jabotabek MRT Project with each entity
(JMC, Companies A, B, and C) is separately standing . Source: Blok M - Kota
MRT Project, Ownership Structure Alternatives Report, the MRT Project
Management Unit, March 1996.
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Figure 7 Option 2: Structure of the Jabotabek MRT Project with JMC and
Company A are Merged, and Company B Owns the Electrical and Mechanical
Assets. Source: Blok M - Kota MRT Project, Ownership Structure Alternatives
Report, the MRT Project Management Unit, March 1996.
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Figure 8 Option 3: the Structure of the Jabotabek MRT Project with JMC and
Company A are Merged, and Company B does not Own the Electrical and
Mechanical Assets. Source: Blok M - Kota MRT Project, Ownership Structure
Alternatives Report, the MRT Project Management Unit, March 1996.
Figure 9 Option 4: the Structure of the Jabotabek MRT Project with JMC and
Companies A and B are Merged. Source: Blok M - Kota MRT Project,
Ownership Structure Alternatives Report, the MRT Project Management Unit,
March 1996.
commercial activity of operating the MRT with the non-commercial activity of owning the
civil assets. This merging unavoidably introduces an unacceptable level of uncertainty for
private investors in terms of accounting profit and therefore their return on equity. Hence,
the private investors may be concerned that the profits from the MRT operation will be
diluted by accounting (not cash) losses from the ownership of the civil works.5 Therefore,
the benefit of the simplicity of institutional arrangement offered by this option seems to be
undermined by the likely difficulties introduced in raising private equity investors.
Options 2 and 3 are worth discussing in more detail since both are relatively simpler
and create less conflict. Table 2 shows the financing plan (assets of the Companies A and B)
for both options. If option 2 is chosen, the total required investment of Company A,
including the interest costs, commitment fees, and foreign exchange losses will be about Rp.
3,673 billion (about US $ 1.6 billion), with the construction period of 4 years and 3 months. 6
The ratio of debt to total assets is about 94 % which is very high. If option 3 is chosen, which
also includes the capital cost for electrical and mechanical expenses, the cost will be about
Rp. 5,286 billion (about US$ 2.3 billion). The ratio of debt to total assets is 89.5 %. While
the investment cost of Company B is about Rp. 1,536 billion for option 2 and Rp. 323 billion
for option 3, which will be invested in Company A.
Option 2 assumes that the DKI contributes all equity for Company A and nothing for
Company B. Both options require the private investors to contribute equity in Company B.
In option 3, however, this private equity for Company B is invested in Company A for the
5 These accounting losses are related with the timing of accounting depreciation versus the debt
and timing of its service payment.
6 Foreign currency rate is 2,340 Rp./US$ (1996).
right to operate the MRT and becomes equity share of Company B in Company A. So, the
private investors together with DKI basically contribute equity to Company A, but they do
not expect returns form their equity.
Table 2 Financing Plan for The MRT Project (In Rp. Millions) 7
Corporate Financing Option #2 Option #3
Entity
Company A Equity:
DKI 234,000 234,000
Private (from Company B) 0 322,672
Debt:
OECF8  1,391,219* 1,390,973*
German Mixed Credits 0 788,393*
U.K. Mixed Credits 149,831* 146,152*
Export Credit: DKI 0 0
Project finance 0 1,030,095
Commercial (local) 450,000* 450,000*
Commercial (Foreign)
DKI 1,448,103* 805,575*
Project Finance 0 118,387
Company B Equity:
DKI 0 0
Private 385,728 322,672+
Debt (project finance):
German Mixed Credits 778,343* 0
Export Credit 372,073 0
Note: * DKI as a guarantor or borrower
+ to be invested in Company A for the right of leasing
During the operation, both options also suggest that Company A receives no cash
inflow except debt service support from DKI which is channeled through JMF. In this case,
DKI is required to borrow, on-lend, and guarantee funds for debt financing of the investment.
7 This financing plan is taken from "Blok-M Kota MRT Project, Ownership Structure
Alternatives Report", March 1996.
8 OECF stands for the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund; This is the Japanese financial
institution that has been a major lender for infrastructure development in Indonesia for
decades.
Soft financing/mixed credits are available for the project from Japan, Germany, and the U.K.
supported by a guarantee from the MoF. The debt financing is also assumed to be provided
by multilateral lenders and/or both domestic and foreign commercial banks. These possible
multilateral loans are secured by a DKI guarantee.
Project finance loans are used in both options to cover electrical and mechanical
works not covered by soft financing/mixed credits. Option 3, however, makes use of a higher
portion of such a scheme, i.e., Rp. 1,030 billion from export credit and and Rp. 118,987
million from foreign commercial debt. Both are amounting to about Rp. 1.2 billion (or 22 %
of total funding requirement). Potential lenders of the project finance scheme generally
require a higher premium on their investment and reliable protection as this financing
mechanism may create a higher level of risk for them than any other type of financing
(Nevitt, 1989). For these reasons, these loans in option 2 are secured over the assets of
Company B and its rights under various agreements, while those in option 3 are secured by
first ranking security over the assets and contractual rights of Company A, including an
assignment of the lease rentals from Company B.
Both options require government contributions in terms of equity, debt, and
guarantees. DKI will be required to provide: a) equity to Company A for the initial
investment; b) debt service on and tax liability payment of Company A; c) payment of foreign
exchange losses on foreign currency debt financing in Company B; and d) contingent liability
to Company B in respect to revenue support. In addition, option 2 requires that DKI assumes
contingent liability with respect to Company B meeting its debt service obligations to DKI for
soft/mixed credits on-lent to Company B by DKI. Moreover, in both options the Ministry of
Finance is obliged to: a) guarantee sovereign soft loans/mixed credits made available to DKI
to part finance the MRT; b) provide foreign exchange hedging to DKI to cover realized
foreign exchange losses on foreign currency loans raised to finance the MRT; and c) provide a
letter of comfort regarding the performance by DKI of its obligations under various
arrangements related to the MRT project.
If the MoF cannot provide either its guarantee to secure soft loans/mixed credits or
foreign exchange hedging, a revised debt financing plan for both options and a change in the
equity structure of Company A are called for. With the absence of the MoF guarantee and
thus soft financing/mixed credits for Company A, it is necessary to add more equity,
specifically from the private investors. This is essential in order to qualify Company A for
additional private financing from prospective lenders, for example multilateral banks (OECF).
Moreover, DKI through the JMF needs to inject additional revenue into Company A to
achieve a desirable Return on Equity (ROE) to the private sectors.9
4.2 Comparative Financing Evaluation
Besides being simple, the ownership structure of the MRT project has to be evaluated
on the basis of agreed criteria among project parties to ensure their compliance and to secure
the sustainability of the MRT system. It is obvious that financing is key factor in shaping the
institutional option. Therefore, criteria such as a minimum level of government financing
contribution and commitment, maximum utilization of financing potential including the
9 The private equity investors, according to the government calculation, may accept an ROE at
least of 20% on their equity in Company A, if the equity is held 60% by DKI and 40% by private
investors.
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option of a scheme of project finance, commercial and tax efficiency, and a substantial level
of private financing are those among crucially determining factors.
4.2.1 Required Funding from DKI
Ineluctably, private participation in the MRT system make a subsidized arrangement
harder to defend. Should the project be able to use public money to finance a transit service
for which the project will charge? DKI may, however, consider the transit subsidy as a way
to improve a credit quality of the MRT project and offsets some of those risks that are usually
associated with the operation. In the same way, the subsidy can be a basis for selecting the
most appropriate project ownership structure, and awarding concession among potential
private developers. For example, the franchise scheme would award the right to build,
operate and transfer or own the transit facility to companies bidding for the lowest
government subsidy.
Nevertheless, the burden of subsidy to be provided by DKI is substantial. It is
anticipated that DKI has to inject Rp. 234 billion (equivalent to US$ 100 million) in equity
into Company A during the construction period for each proposed project structure. Whether
or not DKI (via JMF) can fund the level of such a direct contribution is one major issue. This
depends on how much the revenue generated from the proposed schemes of congestion
pricing and down town parking overcharges, or other taxes under DKI jurisdiction, can fulfill
the huge required investment. In addition, each option requires debt service payment and
certain contingent liability with respect to revenue support by DKI. As can be seen from
Table 2, option 2 requires more debt guarantees from DKI, or DKI itself as a borrower.
Therefore, DKI may consider that option 2 is inferior to option 3.10
4.2.2 Utilization of Project Finance Scheme
Unlike a traditional large scale transport project, the MRT project, particularly for
electrical and mechanical works, will be financed on a project finance basis as it is developed
by forming an entirely new company, with no previous performance records or credit
standings. The potential lenders and investors may, therefore, look primarily to the validity
of the projection of the project's cash flow for the debt repayment and return on investment.
They consider the MRT project's asset as collateral in the event of default. If the project
during the operational phase cannot generate enough revenue to service the debt, lenders
would have recourse to the project's assets but not to the IJEG or DKI as the project
sponsors.
As a ramification, the sponsors obtain advantages from the project finance scheme
that in no way affects their credit standings or balance sheets. Option 3 offers a higher
portion of debt financing from such a scheme, and therefore provides a more comfortable
arrangement to the project sponsors. However, the project sponsors have to make sure that
the financing structure also provides sufficient credit support through their guarantees or
undertakings in such a way that the potential lenders will be willing to participate and be
satisfied with the credit risk.
10 It is not within the scope of this thesis to discuss the scheme of congestion pricing that might
be considered for the MRT project. According to the government study on that scheme, which is
very preliminary, a congestion charge of Rp. 4,000 (about US $ 1.5) for passenger vehicle and
Rp. 2,000 (about US $ .85) for motorcycles may be desirable to shift the private travelers to the
public and thus the proposed mass rapid transit (ALMEC - the Road Pricing Group, 1996).
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4.2.3 Commercial and Tax Efficiency
In option 3, Company B has to pay to Company A the equity subscribed in Company
B by the private sector investors. Part of this amount could represent equity although this
option does not anticipate Company A paying dividends. If this is a case, that equity
investment requires higher commercial return than any other investment opportunities
available to the private investors. This financing, therefore, is likely to be more expensive
than debt alternatives and would not represent the most cost efficient solution for DKI in the
financing of Company A. Indeed, the investors will also need to have priority in respect of
dividend distribution and require safeguards over their commercial interests. This raises
another issue of the level of management control and voting rights the investors will have in
the project company, i.e., Company A. For these logical reasons DKI may avoid such a
potential conflict and, thereby, may not be in favor of option 3.
There is no a complete analysis made during the basic design with regard to taxation
and its impact on the financial projection, and consequently on the project structures. The
private investors will be interested in all tax benefits from the project, including tax status of
all income from JMF to company A and B, value added tax and import duty exemption on
imported material for construction, availability and procedure to obtain special tax incentives,
e.g. tax holiday, and status of income tax on lease rental paid by company B to company A.
They of course will be in favor of a project structure that furnishes as high a tax shield as
possible.
All options, however, require a significant amount of reliance on external borrowing
that require government guarantees. Such guarantees are important to attract potential
investors, particularly those are private foreign investors, for whom distance is an obstacle to
the acquisition of information of the project. While the guarantees offset the project credit
rating, they tend to discourage the private investors to monitor the management of the project
companies. For example, the investors my no longer stand to lose - or to lose as much. In
the extreme case, this might encourage the construction of the MRT where there is not
enough confidence of generating adequate ridership to service the debt that is incurred. In
addition to that, the fact that the construction generates an abundant cash flow provides a
greater incentive to the project companies to negotiate sweetheart deals with contractors and
divert the project resources into other uses. Since many partnerships are temporary, the
project sponsors have little reason to be deterred by reputational considerations. Only those
eventually responsible for the financial liability - or more precisely, DKI and MoF - have an
incentive to engage in monitoring.
4.3 Project Risk Management
Project risk can be defined as potential events that expose the government and the
project companies to unexpected problems that will have an adverse impact on the privatized
project performance and/or result in additional financial costs (Walker and Smith, 1995). A
generic source of risks of the MRT project includes: a) the notorious inaccuracy of demand
projections in transport which leads to uncertainties regarding the level of project users
acceptance -market risk; b) changes in costs of materials inputs acquired outside of the
country that cause significant uncertainties regarding to project cost, and timing and financing
for completion -construction risk; c) the possibility of a reach change in national government
and the beginning of a new administration with a different structure of purpose, especially
given that so many rules of the game are in the government's hands -political risk; and d)
further changes in the national economy on account of the fortunes of oil.
Due to the nature of the MRT project with its huge initial investment and employing
highly sophisticated technology, the risks of completion and cost overrun are relatively high
compared to those for other (transport) infrastructure projects. Unlike option 2, option 3 with
leasing arrangement does not require Company B to assume this construction risks, and thus
requires Company A, to bear all the construction risks.
A turnkey project with a reliable and experienced construction company, for example,
can be chosen to alleviate the completion risk. If the turnkey contract for the design and
construction of the transit project is chosen, Company B, whether it owns the project assets
(option 2) or not (option 3), will require control over the design and construction because it is
responsible for the project's operation and maintenance. DKI, however, as an owner of the
civil assets via Company A must also have some control over the design and construction.
Who will control the turnkey contract, and who will pay the cost overruns and the design
variations need to be settled.
The most crucial risk in this project, however, is market risk due to a great uncertainty
of demand projections and thus the revenue to be generated by the project. The market risk
can be reduced by conducting an accurate forecasting of passenger demand. To guarantee
reliability a sensitivity analysis of the forecasting should be also included. This demand
study along the corridor should be performed by a consultant with a distinguished reputation,
who will take into account realistic assumptions about future economic and demographic
development of the city. By the same token, the tariff issue has to be reviewed and discussed
in great detail by the government and the project companies as early as possible to form a
clear framework for negotiation at a later stage. DKI's controls and policies for rate
adjustment are key issues for private sector developers and financial institutions. The
agreement on the tariff issue may include a fare rate setting, and the development of formulas
for rate adjustment mechanisms. Both options (option 2 and 3) require that only Company B
assumes this market risk. To reduce the market risk, Company B requires DKI to assume
contingent liability, with respect to revenue support -whatever financial injection is needed if
the ridership of the transit system is below a feasible benchmark.
Uncertainties in changes of interest rate and inflation, foreign currency fluctuation and
international price movements of raw materials, and expropriation as well as changes in
regulatory regime, are those risks that are beyond the control of the negotiating parties. The
project, for example, will borrow a higher portion of the project debt in foreign currencies
(US $, Yen, DM, Pound Sterling) in order to pay foreign purchases. Unlike commercial
products where some portions are exported to earn foreign currency revenues, the MRT
project earns revenue in local currency (Rupiah). This creates a risk of default should
convertibility of the Rupiah to foreign currency be restricted or made difficult due to
unexpected changes in economic conditions. The incentive to finance the project costs with
foreign currencies comes from the fact that the interest rates of most foreign currencies are
lower than that of Rupiah thereby reducing debt repayment costs and enhancing project
profitability. On the other hand, financing local expenditures (labor or construction
materials) with foreign currency debt subjects the government to a significant foreign
currency risk, and could adversely affect the future availability of foreign currency debt
needed for export oriented economic investments.
The country currently does not have a viable commercial legal system where disputes
can be adjudicated through a proven and unbiased institutionalized legal system." An
undeveloped commercial legal system leaves the potential lenders and the project companies
exposed to unilateral actions by government which may adversely impact on project
feasibility and threaten project loan repayment. The lack of these legal and regulatory
environments complicates the project risk management. The private investors will not
proceed with the MRT project unless the government provides stringent guarantees spelled
out in the agreements that such predicaments will not happen.
To eliminate the potential legal risk the project companies will request the legal basis
for some important undertakings. For example, JMC and Company A will require an
assurance regarding the identity of the grantor of the concession, the source of authority to
grant the concession, the interrelation between the Railway Law (Law No. 13 of 1992) and
the MRT project framework, and the status of the JMF. Similarly, to alleviate the foreign
currency risk, the project sponsors will need assurance from the MoF regarding the non-
restricted currency conversion (foreign exchange hedging on foreign currency used as debt)
and the tax exemption for financial instruments in using domestic capital, which would carry
a lower interest rate and be competitive with foreign currency financing.
11 The Law No. 13 of May 1992 regarding the railway affairs is the only law that provides a
basis for public/private cooperation in railway transportation. The law stipulates that: a) the
government shall implement railway affairs and transfer the implementation of railway affairs
to the executing body established for that purpose on the basis of laws in force; b) corporate
bodies other than the executing body can take part in railway affairs on the basis of cooperation
DKI, both as a representative of the government and a sponsor of the project, must
also be aware of the risk if the private sector partners are the major shareholders in the project
venture, and thus operators of the system and recipients of the project cash inflow. This may
reduce or postpone long term revenue to the government because of its reduced risk. The
quality of transit services rendered may also be difficult to guarantee, while the imposition of
commercial fare charges on the previously lower-fare public transit system may bring about
public objection and be politically undesirable.
To mitigate such unattractive situations and protect public interests, the government
must introduce an effective legal framework that can force the project companies to deliver
the transport provision at the expected level of service, and be liable for non-commercial
tasks. To anchor the existing Railway Law, a draft of a Presidential Decree on public-private
partnership is currently under discussion by the government. This indicates the government
intention to formulate a stringent legal basis for the involvement of the private sectors in
infrastructure projects.12 Along with the legal framework, competent monitoring of the
private sector's work must be institutionalized within the framework of the MRT project
structure. This can be accomplished through JMC, whose board of management is partly
represented by government agencies (DKI, MoC, and others). Thus, if the worst comes to the
worst, the government will have the right to take over unsuccessful ventures before maturity
of the franchise.
with the executing agency; and c) the types and requirements of cooperation shall be further
regulated by a government regulation.
12 A draft of the new Presidential Decree on Public-Private Partnership (BOT Law) is currently
under discussion by high level of government officials. The general principles seem to refer to
the general practices of the successful BOT/BOO projects around the world. The World Bank
and the government are working together extensively on this matter.
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The MoF will also face serious risks in its support of the project financing, and these
must be taken into account. As the project is financed mostly by private debt, the MoF
should provide protections by guaranteeing the debt service. If the MoF agrees to provide the
cushions/hedging against foreign exchange fluctuations or force majeure conditions, that the
project companies expect, the government may incur financial liabilities during many phases
of the project implementation and even beyond. All of these are contingent liabilities - all
situations where, although the government may have not committed itself to expend public
funds at the outset of a privately-financed project.
Moreover, the incentives to provide a relaxation of taxation requirements may also
violate the consistency of the established policy. For example, a relaxation of foreign
exchange regulations may undermine the country's balance-of-payment positions and credit
rating.
The objective of risk diversification is not to eliminate entirely all of these project
risks; instead, it is to balance the risks so that all parties involved have a vested financial
interest in the successful development and operation of the transit project. Risk has to be
allocated properly among parties through the various contracts, insurance policies, bonds, or
letters of credit. The contractual arrangements in turn have to be enforced trough various
mechanisms to ensure that they are met during the project implementation. These will be
discussed in the following section.
4.4 The Security Package
As risk allocations of the transit project are clearly agreed upon among parties
involved in the project, it is important that the risk mitigation be properly documented in a
well defined security package. DKI together with the IJEG must make sure that, while the
project is attractive to potential lenders, the mitigation of the project risk is within the reach
of all parties' capacities and expectations. Risks and rewards have to be clearly spelled out
and well accepted, through various contractual and commercial arrangements. The package
is comprised of several key project agreements, contracts, and the government undertakings,
such as commitments and guarantees. The success of this concession type of contract relies
on a successful analysis, the allocation and mitigation of risks, and on a solid contract
package.13
According to the World Bank (1994), prospective lenders must be satisfied that
project agreements set up for the security package meet their requirements and have been
executed. The project agreements generally consist of: a) the implementation agreements; b)
the revenue agreements-as opposed to the power purchase agreements as proposed by the
World Bank for power project; c) the ownership structure agreement; d) the land conveyance
agreement; e) the construction contracts; and e) the operation and maintenance agreement. 14
The implementation agreement is made between the project companies and the
government agencies who have the authority to provide guarantees, assurances, and support
necessary for the MRT project. This agreement may contain a variety of commitments,
13 None of the project agreements have been formulated, except for some basic considerations of
the overall project structure and financing on the basis of which the agreement can be set down
for negotiation. Only after the basic design is completed can the project agreements be
formulated.
14 Although they are intended for a private power project, the main agreements that make up the
security package can also be applied to the transit project with the exception of the agreement
for power purchase, which can be applied solely for infrastructure that has an identifiable
buyer, in this case the power purchaser. The transit project, however, has a large number of
unidentifiable purchaser, i.e. the travelers, which leads to additional provisions as featured in
the project structures.
inducements and guarantees, such as sovereign guarantee for soft loans/mixed credits, foreign
exchange hedging, etc., that can only given by the government. It may also contain terms and
conditions necessary to ensure the effectiveness of other key project agreements, particularly
the revenue and ownership structure. Accordingly, the project companies will carefully focus
on remedies for the risks created by the substantial involvement of DKI in many phases of the
project development. DKI will make sure there is a consistent commitment across all levels
of government agencies to the privatization of the MRT project. DKI will also ensure that
the project, during the concession term, will provide adequate level transit quality, observe
relevant safety and environmental standard, set the transit fare at a reasonable level, and carry
out prudent maintenance and operation. In short, this agreement will guarantee the
performance of the government agencies (DKI and MoF) for the project and, will define the
required performance of the project companies.
Revenue agreements may be executed prior to negotiation with the prospective
lenders, since they may require the assurance of a reliable revenue stream to cover debt
payment. These agreements, which establish revenue sharing obligations among project
companies (JMC, Company A, B, and C), tend to be complex. They also rule future
adjustments to fare levels, revenue support, and penalties or bonuses for exceeding or failing
to meet the performance guarantee. Neither take-or-pay nor throughput contracts, which are
usually used in power project agreements, can be applied as countermeasures for the revenue
risk. 15 For debt financing purpose, a direct tripartite revenue agreement among Company B,
15 The take-or-pay contract is a long term guarantee to sell the product, service, commodity, or
service produced by a project to one or more users at certain time intervals, and at agreed
prices with appropriate escalation (Nevitt, 1989). The throughput agreement is a guarantee
given by the project sponsors or the parent companies to service the loan (Meyers, 1991).
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project finance lenders, and DKI/MoF as a grantor of the concession should be established.
This tripartite agreement establishes the obligations of Company B and identifies the type of
transaction (e.g. leasing or BOO).
Ownership agreements describe the structure and obligations of the parties in the
project companies. These agreements connect all project documents, specify where the
ultimate recourse to the lenders and other parties lies, and address the financial, tax and
liability structures. JMC and Company A, in both option 2 and 3, are obligated to cause all
the parties to perform in accordance with the concession agreement, to limit other parties'
indebtedness and investments, and to furnish the documentation required by lenders or
project sponsors. Land conveyance agreements transfer land ownership to the JMC, which
may either purchase the land or execute a long-term lease. Land must be used exclusively to
the project purpose and must be assignable to the lenders so they can take over the facility in
case of default. The agreement also identifies the party responsible for the payment of
government taxes levied on the site, equipment, or other personal property.
Construction agreements permit the project companies (JMC and Company A) to
enter into contracts with construction companies to develop the transit facility. These
contracts can be written as turnkey projects covering supply, erection and commissioning,
and thereby reduce the project completion risk faced by the project companies. Finally, JMC
and Company A enter into the management and operation agreements with the Company B to
supply operate and maintain the transit facility. Because of the importance of operation
management and maintenance practices to the long term performance of the transit facility,
the agreements must provide assurance regarding the obligations of Company B and quality
standards under the implementation and revenue agreements.
Enforcement of the contractual agreements discussed above is critical to the success
of the project. Agreed mechanisms of the enforcement have to be incorporated in the
privatization agreements to make sure that the provision of contract will be fulfilled. This is
generally stipulated in the implementation agreement under legal sanctions clause: fines,
penalties, also a last resort - take-over of the project for real substantial undesirable
performance. For example, if the project companies refuse or fail to perform any of the
provisions of the approved agreements that jeopardize the project's completion, operation
and maintenance, the government through DKI may either take-over the facility and assume
all attendant liabilities or allow the project's lenders/investors to assign the project to another
companies.
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
5.1 Efforts to Define and Improve the Jakarta Urban Transport System
Efforts to increase the effective road space, i.e., by expanding a highway network in
the capital city of Jakarta, have only palliated the transport problem, since after a very short
time the congestion closed in again, and reduced the efficacy of the earlier investments. The
real source of the transport problem, however, lies in the physical, institutional, and
conceptual deficiencies of the transport services. These deficiencies contribute substantially
to the relentless transport problem, not to mention a retardation of the economic growth of
the city. For these reasons, the government of Indonesia has tried to solve the problem by
taking steps in the decision making processes before it delivers a well defined system.
5.1.1 The Need For a Systematic Transport Development Planning
The fundamental resolution of whether the Jabotabek should undertake a mass rapid
system or not is a major policy decision not, merely a technical issues. After deciding on the
need for a mass rapid transit system in the city, the government made fundamental decisions
on the planning process for the MRT before considering it ready for engineering design and
construction. These decisions addressed the definition of transit modes, network layout,
facilities and furniture, level of services, and funding including private financing. The
decomposition of the MRT planning has helped the government to obtain a better
understanding and broader perspective of many alternative solutions. The basic design, a
step before project implementation, circumscribes final features of the MRT system that are
acceptable to both the government and the potential private investors, and at the same time
are affordable for the city traveler. This is also a starting point in the public-private
partnership in the overall planning process of the MRT project development.
5.1.2 The Need For Strategic Alliances
The size and complexity of the MRT project preclude effective management and
control by a single entity. For this reason, the government as the project sponsor encourages
several companies, such as public, local and foreign private, with different financial strengths
and technical expertise to form a specialized company(s) for the project development.
Potential lenders will be extremely concerned with the choice of the project participants and
their ability to manage and support the project. Incentives to achieve guaranteed
performances and enforcement to maintain desired performances of the project participants
need to be structured in the contractual agreements.
5.1.3 The Need For a Project Finance Scheme
The burgeoning cost of the MRT project also requires the government to apply a
complex process of financing beyond the conventional sources of funds. This includes the
adoption of the scheme of project finance -a method of funding a project based on the cash
flow of that project. This scheme can be a key factor in the success of the project
development because it provides a means through which private resources can be used for
public infrastructures. To be qualified for the scheme, the project has to be completely
independent and well defined. It should generate adequate cash flows to make it attractive to
private investors who can claim the assets and cash flows of only the project. To give up
recourse to the project sponsors, the lenders must also be protected against the failure of the
project companies (or other related parties) to live up to their part of the bargain. If these
prerequisites cannot be attained during the project development, the project finance package
cannot be successful.
5.2 Strategic Financial and Institutional Options
Four possible project structures have been discussed. Option 1 conforms with the
initial government proposal but it contains redundancy and contractual complications
between JMC and Company A. Option 4, on the other hand, offers oversimplified ownership
structure in which a single company owns and operates the system, and thereby creates
unnecessary conflicts between commercial and non-commercial activities. Option 2 and 3, in
which JMC and Company A are merged, are likely to be more appropriate. They offer a
simple and reliable structure. The distinction between the two is determined whether or not
Company B owns the electrical and mechanical assets.
Option 2 (concession) allows that Company B owns part of the MRT assets. This
encourages the introduction of managerial and technical efficiencies and least cost practices -
built-in incentives. The success of this option relies heavily on the quality of investment
decisions by the project sponsors, especially those who own Company B. If these are based
on faulty market analysis or an imperfect understanding of the transit user preferences, the
efficiency of the transit provision will be impaired. Next, the success of option 3 (leasing
arrangement) depends heavily on the existence of close regulatory oversight in order to
ensure compliance with policy objectives of Jabotabek transport development and to sustain a
high quality of transit services. Its effective implementation also relies on a careful definition
of the roles and responsibilities of the lessee, Company B, with respect to the regulatory and
policy-making function of the government.
5.2.1 The Need for Comprehensive Valuation of the Option
Even though both options require the same amount of DKI direct subsidy, option 3
with leasing arrangement can be less attractive to DKI because this option requires DKI to
assume all construction risks. In other words, to the extent that the construction risks are
shared with private concessionaire, as offered in option 2, the government risks is reduced.
Option 2, therefore, is more desirable. On the other hand, option 3 is preferable to option 2
because it provides DKI more management control over the assets, and at the same time
provides more non-recourse financing (the project finance scheme) in which creditors receive
no government guarantees -but can only lay claim on the project companies' assets and
revenues.
However, the decision to choose among the two cannot rely solely on commercial
matters. Other considerations have to be included into a set of decision parameter. These
may include the capacity of DKI to undertake the project which still requires major
improvement, the existence of an effective regulatory framework which is not yet fully in
place in the country, and positive external effects which may be drawn on the adoption of
private investment for infrastructure.
5.2.2 The Need for Government Subsidy and Guarantees
It appears that the project structure is defined to avoid inefficiency of public
administration and, more importantly, to tap private (local and foreign) capital and to avoid
excessive reliance on government funds and contributions. This approach requires a stringent
definition of private provision and private finance. What the options for project structure
reveal, however, is that the private provision and financing do not obviate the need for
government intervention in terms of direct subsidy and guarantees -government subsidy and
guaranteed external finance are still integral in the process.
5.3 Implications for Urban Transport Development Policy
Within the next ten to fifteen years, there will be major urban developments, other
than Jabotabek. Of course, the demand for transport in urban areas will be increasing, and
this requires the central and local governments to seek more innovative financing for
providing the necessary transport facilities. The planning approach for the MRT
development seems to be workable and provides a preliminary model for designing a similar
transport provision.
5.3.1 The Need for an Effective Public Oversight
The government intervention, trough its subsidy and guarantees, seems to simply
replace one set of problems with another. Private investors, having been guaranteed a return
by government, have little incentive to monitor management performance. Management,
freed by investor scrutiny and having gained capital market-access courtesy of government,
could seal sweetheart deals with construction companies. Guarantees may render irrelevant
information problems that hinder investors' effort to evaluate the commercial prospects of the
MRT project, but without providing a mechanism to monitor the uses of external funds and
protect the public interest. Government subsidies are particularly important for attracting
foreign investors. Without the guarantees, the MRT project is impossible to finance.
However, while guarantees help the project sponsors surmount credit-rationing problem, they
also weaken the incentive for investors to monitor management.
The implication is that exploiting a non-traditional approach to finance the MRT
project requires two further initiatives on the part of policy makers: a) the effectiveness of
public administration must be improved to ensure the accountability of the project
companies. This is because private investors may have little interest in that accountability if
they enjoy substantial government guarantees; and b) policy makers need to encourage
further the development of financial institutions such as investment banks, mutual funds and
bond rating agencies, etc., in order to free the government of the need to provide subsidies
and interest guarantee. 1
5.3.2 The Need for Fuller Participation of the Private Sector
Even though in options 2 and 3 of the project structure the private sectors contribute
to the MRT development, a majority of the funds is basically governmental. In considering a
private sector involvement in the transport sector, it seems necessary to clarify the legal
framework for facilitating private participation, in particular, and the management of
transport development and its effectiveness, in general.
These may include: a) clarification and consolidation of laws and regulations relevant
for urban transport development, including the objectives and principle for the promotion of
the private sectors participation as well as the guidelines and manuals for promoting,
negotiating and consummating agreements with private sector partner, such as model of
agreement and codes of conduct;2 b) more systematic formulation of regulations for the
1 This will not happen too quickly. Nevertheless, Indonesia is already undergoing capital market
development reform that encourages financial institutions to take on greater participation in
infrastructure development.
2 The procurement regulation is a good example of the fact the government requires to prepare a
more supportive environment for private participation. Presidential Decree No.16 of 1994,
more popularly referred to as Keppres 16 the Indonesian truncation of Keputusan Presiden,
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implementation of transport laws -providing more precise instruments for the
implementation of laws and avoiding some of the confusion that generally exists when
different agencies or level of governments independently formulate their own regulations for
the same law; c) enforcement of regulations; and d) improvement in regulatory systems and
legal procedures for protecting the right of individual, protecting the public interest, and
resolving conflicts in urban land use, development right, responsibility for urban environment
quality.
only governs the procurement of goods and services that are funded by the state budget.
Privately funded projects are not regulated by the Indonesia's procurement regulations
(Sullivan, 1995). This creates a problem, since the MRT project will be undertaken by a large
private consortium comprised primarily of foreign contractors.
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